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This paper reflects on the qualitative risk analysis framework 
developed for a Foresight study on the Detection and Identification 
of Infectious Diseases, which was coordinated in 2005 by the 
United Kingdom (UK) under what is now the Government Office for 
Science, Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. The risk 
assessment covered human, plant and animal diseases in the UK 
and Africa in the years 2015 and 2030. Through engaging a diverse 
pool of experts, we developed a model conceptualising disease 
spread as the outcome of interactions among sources, pathways 
and drivers. We then used this model to conduct a Delphi survey of 
experts. The factors perceived most likely to contribute to infectious 
disease spread in 2015 and 2030 included geographic extension 
of existing pathogens (partially due to climate change), over-use 
of antibiotics/antivirals/pesticides leading to drug resistance, and 
zoonoses. Our methodology provides a framework for those who 
need to integrate a wide range of perspectives and factors into their 
planning and analyses. 
Introduction
It is by now well documented that a wide range of factors, 
including changes in land use and agricultural practices, changes 
in human demography, pathogen evolution, international travel 
and trade, climate change, and poor public health infrastructures 
can all trigger or exacerbate the spread of infectious diseases, 
determining how and where they will emerge in the future and the 
circumstances under which they could progress to epidemic or even 
pandemic proportions (Table 1) [1-5]. 
Less widely documented are methods for analysing these 
factors in ways that enable a better understanding of how they 
are interlinked and how to prioritise their importance. One of the 
key challenges is that relevant information, when available, is not 
consolidated in a few hands but spread across numerous institutions 
and disciplines. Anticipating the emergence or altered transmission 
of any disease is likely to require expertise in biology, epidemiology, 
animal and human medicine, demographics, economics, and even 
sociology and anthropology. Although the importance of cross-
sectoral collaboration in disease control is increasingly recognised 
[6-8], there remains the need to develop new ways of ensuring that 
diverse and sometimes divergent perspectives are accounted for. 
Doing so is essential for developing multi-sectoral understanding 
and commitment – increasingly required for the pursuit of pubic 
health action in a rapidly changing world.
With a long-term vision in mind, the United Kingdom (UK), 
under what is now the Government Office for Science, Department 
for Innovation, Universities and Skills, conducted a Foresight 
project on Detection and Identification of Infectious Diseases (DIID) 
with the objective of supporting strategic investment in disease 
detection, identification and monitoring technologies and systems 
[9-12]. This paper reflects on the risk analysis component of the 
DIID project, describing a methodology that could be adapted to 
subsequent analyses.
Methodology
We analysed expert opinion on infectious disease risks in plants, 
animals and humans, in sub-Saharan Africa and the UK in 2015 
and 2030 (comprehensive details on the methodology, workshop 
T a b l e  1
Main categories of drivers associated with emergence and 
reemergence of human pathogens (reproduced from Woolhouse et 
al. (2005) [5])
Rank* Driver
1 Changes in land use or agricultural practices
2 Changes in human demographics and society
3 Poor population health (e.g., HIV, malnutrition)
4 Hospitals and medical procedures
5 Pathogen evolution (e.g., antimicrobial drug resistance, increased virulence)
6 Contamination of food sources or water supplies
7 International travel
8 Failure of public health programs
9 International trade
10 Climate change
* Ranked by the number of pathogen species associated with them (most to 
least).
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and survey results are available at the Foresight website [12]). 
Potential changes in sources, pathways and drivers of disease risks 
were identified and assessed according to how the magnitude and 
nature of risks are evolving, as well as the range of plausible future 
risk patterns. Research questions focused on:
• Factors driving changes in infectious disease risks (‘risk drivers’) 
and how they might evolve; 
• Future risks for infectious diseases and their importance; 
• Uncertainty attached to future risks; 
• Comparisons among plant, animal and human disease risks.
To answer these questions a preliminary scoping phase, which 
included an expert workshop, developed an understanding of 
important issues and their interactions and formulated the overall 
approach to the research. A Delphi survey was then carried out in 
order to assess a broad range of expert opinions on future risks in 
the UK and Africa.
Scoping phase
The scoping workshop brought together 22 UK infectious disease 
experts (recommended by the UK Foresight Scientific Advisory 
Group) to advise on the challenges presented by new and emerging 
infectious diseases. A disease systems model was developed (Figure 
1), as well as an initial list of key factors (“drivers”) likely to give 
rise to changes in disease patterns and emergence of new diseases, 
such as biological changes and socio-economic factors acting on 
disease sources and pathways of disease spread. The initial long 
list of drivers derived at the workshop was refined and clustered 
under the six main headings listed in Table 2.
Identification and selection of participants for the survey
The experts who took part in the Delphi survey were scientists 
selected to cover a broad range of expertise in plant, animal 
and human diseases, from epidemiological modelling, disease 
identification and disease pathology to disease control, regulation 
and policy making. They were selected upon the advice of 
approximately 30 senior advisers who took part in the DIID Foresight 
project, including members of the UK Foresight Scientific Advisory 
Group, the UK Foresight High Level Stakeholder Group and UK 
Health Protection Agency staff, to represent the best available 
informed judgement across our six areas of interest – the future 
development of plant, animal and human diseases in the UK and 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
African respondents from 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
were invited on the basis of the best available expertise, rather than 
ensuring geographical equity. Francophone countries were under-
represented as we did not have sufficient time within the project 
to translate questionnaires. This omission may have influenced 
the findings. There was, however, no evidence of any specific bias 
among the 55% respondents who completed the questionnaires, 
with relatively equal representation across the six survey areas 
(Table 3), and also across relevant areas of expertise (20 areas of 
expertise were mentioned in the questionnaire responses). 
Questionnaire development
A two-stage questionnaire-based survey was sent to 145 experts 
in infectious diseases from the UK and sub-Saharan Africa. In 
the second stage of this Delphi-type process [13], respondents 
were given the results from the first phase and asked to re-assess 
their own responses. Where their opinions diverged from those of 
others they were asked to explain their reasons rather than being 
encouraged to reach a consensus. 
The questionnaire was based on the disease systems model 
(Figure 1, Table 2), but slightly different versions were sent out 
depending on whether the participants were being asked about 
human, plant, or animal diseases. Nonetheless, the questionnaires 
were designed so as to be as comparable as possible. For example, 
question 3.2.4 in Table 2 was worded as “lack of availability of new 
vaccines or engineered resistance”, broadening the scope of the 
question from vaccines (mainly relevant for humans and animals) 
to also include engineered resistance (mainly relevant for plants 
and animals). As another example, question 2.9 in Table 2 shows 
a question that was worded differentially depending on whether it 
was considering animal or human diseases; however, this question 
was not included in the plant diseases survey.
Each questionnaire asked about future changes in disease 
sources, pathways and drivers, leading to future disease outcomes. 
These terms were defined as follows: 
• Sources: phenomena or biological events that give rise to 
potential new diseases, enable existing diseases to become 
more harmful, enable existing diseases to infect new hosts, or 
enable existing diseases to spread to new areas; 
F i g u r e
The disease systems model as a tool for assessing future infectious 
disease risks
Drivers
CLIMATE CHANGE,
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS (E.G.: GOVERNANCE, 
CONFLICT, ECONOMICS)
Sources
RESERVOIRS
NATURAL
MUTATION
AVAILABLE
NICHES
Pathways
SOIL
AIRBORNE,
FOODBORNE,
WATERBORNE
VECTORS;
DIRECT 
CONTACT,
WASTE DISPOSAL
Outcomes
FUTURE DISEASES 
AND LEVELS OF 
INFECTION IN: 
PEOPLE
PLANTS
ANIMALS
T a b l e  3
Sample size, UK Foresight questionnaire, 2005
Questionnaire 
type No. distributed
No. of 
responses 
(Round 1)
No. of 
responses 
(Round 2)
UK animals 20 10 6
UK humans 20 12 5
UK plants 24 13 5
Africa animals 29 18 11
Africa humans 27 13 9
Africa plants 25 14 6
Total 145 80 42
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Classification of factors influencing the spread of infectious disease, Foresight questionnaire, 2005
Sources
1.1 New pathogens or new strains of existing pathogens arising through natural genetic change 
1.2 Geographical expansion of pathogens 
1.3 Emergence of new disease vectors
1.4 Failure of engineered resistance (e.g. vaccines, genetically manipulated animals/crops)
1.5 Increased number of accidental introductions of pathogens
1.6 Increased pathogen resistance (e.g. to microbicides, antivirals, pesticides)
1.7 Decreased immuno-competence of target populations
1.8 Emergence of new diseases from other species reservoirs, including wild species reservoirs
Pathways
2.1 Increased role of soil-borne route for disease spread
2.2 Increased role of air-borne route for disease spread 
2.3 Increased role of water-borne route for disease spread
2.4 Increased populations of disease vectors
2.5 Increased host-to-host transmission due to increased density of host populations
2.6 Increased role of food-borne (or feed-borne) route for disease spread (plant diseases excluded)
2.7 Increased role of food-borne (or feed-borne) route for disease spread (plant diseases excluded)
2.8 Increased spread of disease in veterinary hospitals and/or herding of animal for veterinary interventions (animal diseases) OR Increased spread of 
disease in hospitals (human diseases) (plant diseases excluded)
2.9 Increased spread of disease through mass veterinary interventions (e.g. campaign vaccinations with shared needles) (animal diseases) OR Increased 
spread of disease through blood/tissue (e.g. needle sharing, blood transfusions, transplantation) (human diseases) (plant diseases excluded)
2.10 Increased spread of disease due to sexual contact (human diseases only) 
Drivers
3.1 Legislation and government systems
3.1.1 Lack of adequate systems for disease control
3.1.2 Lack of adequate surveillance systems to detect and monitor diseases
3.1.3 Poor implementation of national legislation on disease surveillance and control
3.1.4 Poor implementation of international legislation on disease surveillance and control
3.1.5 Lack of or ineffective biosecurity legislation regarding disease surveillance and control
3.1.6 Low degree of inter-institutional cooperation
3.1.7 Failure of government bodies to accurately or honestly report disease incidences
3.2 Technology and innovation
3.2.1 Lack of innovation in relevant and rapid technologies for detection and identification of existing diseases
3.2.2 Lack of innovation in technologies for detection and identification of new diseases
3.2.3 Lack of innovation in information technology for disease surveillance and communication
3.2.4 Lack of availability of new vaccines or engineered resistance
3.2.5 Development of potential new pathogens for bioterrorism
3.2.6 Drug use leading to the emergence of drug-resistant disease organisms
3.2.7 Lack of new food preservation and decontamination technologies
3.2.8 Lack of new drugs (or pesticides for plants) to control disease
3.3 Conflict and war
3.3.1 Loss of effective detection and identification systems
3.3.2 Increased movement of people (e.g. refugees, armies) spreading disease
3.3.3 Damage to infrastructure (e.g. water, sewage, power supplies)
3.3.4 Increased bioterrorism, exploiting existing diseases
3.3.5 Increased use of wild species as alternative human food source (plant diseases excluded)
3.4 Economic factors
3.4.1 Decreased economic prosperity
3.4.2 Increased disparity between rich and poor
3.4.3 Increase in trade and transport of animals and crops
3.4.4 Decreased average education levels
3.4.5 Reduced quality of sanitation and water supplies
3.4.6 Increased movement of migrant workers, spreading disease
3.4.7 Increased number of disease-susceptible individuals in the population
3.5 Human activity and social pressures
3.5.1 Decrease in public willingness to change behaviour in order to help contain or prevent disease
3.5.2 Decrease in individuals’ readiness to report disease incidences
3.5.3 Increase in illegal practices leading to spread of disease
3.5.4 Malnutrition/poor husbandry of animals/crops affecting resistance to disease
3.5.5 Increased travel related to tourism and international business, spreading disease 
3.6 Climate change
3.6.1 Increase in mean temperature in the range of 0.5-2.0 °Celsius
3.6.2 Increase in frequency of heavy rainfall events and/or flooding
3.6.3 Increase in frequency of drought in arid and semi-arid areas
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• Pathways: mechanisms or routes by which a disease-causing 
organism can be transferred from one host to another, within 
or between species; 
• Drivers: social, economic, biological or environmental factors 
that affect disease outcomes, by changing the behaviour of 
disease sources or pathways; 
• Outcomes: plants and animals at the individual, community and 
ecosystem, or farming system level, and humans at individual 
and societal levels, that are affected by infectious diseases.
’Drivers’ operate in the infectious disease system through 
‘sources’ of disease emergence and/or ‘pathways’ of disease 
transmission to determine the ‘outcome’ in terms of the emergence 
of future diseases and the levels of infection. 
‘Risk’ was defined as the product of ‘the future extent of a 
hazard’ and ‘the probability of occurrence of that hazard’. For each 
factor listed in Table 2, the respondents were asked to rate the 
extent and probability of different outcomes in the years 2015 and 
2030, on a three-point scale. The survey thus provided a systematic 
method for gathering informed opinions on rankings of the impact 
of drivers on sources and pathways, as well as on the importance 
of changes in sources and pathways themselves. 
The questionnaires also asked respondents for additional 
observations, including the phenomena or processes they thought 
were likely to decrease risk and what they expected to be future 
risks (for example, which classes of diseases or organisms were 
likely to represent the greatest risk).
Data analysis
Questionnaires generated qualitative scores for both the perceived 
extent of the hazard and the perceived probability of its occurrence 
(1, 2 or 3; low, medium or high). The risk associated with a particular 
factor for each source, pathway and driver was then calculated as 
the product of these two scores, giving a range of potential values: 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6 or 9. , Thus we compared the perceived importance 
of sources, pathways and drivers in contributing to future disease 
outcomes for the six risk questionnaire categories (permutations of 
host and location: Africa-human (AH), UK-human (UKH), Africa-
animal (AA), UK-animal (UKA), Africa-plant (AP), UK-plant (UKP)). 
We focused on factors that were consistently predicted to be of 
higher risk through a data filtering process - risk assessments were 
categorised as low, moderate or high as follows:
• Low risk: an overall score in the range 1-3, i.e. either hazard or 
probability were scored as low (1); 
• Moderate risk: an overall score of 4, i.e. both hazard and 
probability were scored as moderate (2); 
• High risk: an overall score of 6 or 9, i.e. either hazard or 
probability were scored as high (3) and the other was scored 
as moderate or high (2 or 3). 
The first filter selected the cases for which more than 50% of 
the responses were in the moderate or high category (scores 4, 6 
or 9). The second filter selected cases for which more than 50% 
of responses were in the high category (scores 6 or 9). 
Survey results 
Participants
The response rate in the first round of the survey was 55%, and 
53% of the first round respondents contributed to the second round 
(Table 3). The respondents’ self-reported areas of expertise were 
primarily: epidemiology (12%), virology (9%), pest and disease 
management (8%) and animal health and veterinary science 
(7%). This participation rate was more than sufficient to conduct 
the analysis, as breadth of expertise was deemed to have priority 
over absolute number of respondents. The declining number of 
respondents from the first and second round partially reflects 
those participants that did not feel that they needed to alter their 
responses. 
Risk assessments
The complete survey results are available on the UK Foresight 
website [10]. Table 4 compares the factors which, for 2015 and 
2030, passed the first and second filters of 50% or more of 
respondents. 
The highest perceived risks (for 2030) related to:
• new pathogens or new strains of existing pathogens arising 
through natural genetic change; 
• and geographical expansion of pathogens from within or outside 
the UK and Africa.
In five of the six categories there was a perceived high risk of:
• new diseases from other species reservoirs, including wild 
species reservoirs; 
• drug use leading to the emergence of drug-resistant disease 
organisms; 
• an increase in disease due to a mean temperature increase in 
the range 0.5-2 °C.
Changes in sources were seen as important in all six categories 
(plants, animals and humans; UK and Africa), and there was 
little difference between UK and Africa in perceived overall risks 
generated by changes in sources. 
Changes in pathways were seen as less important generators of 
disease risks across all categories than were changes in sources, 
although there were marked differences between UK and Africa. 
Increased host-to-host transmission due to increased density of 
host populations was seen as important for animals, plants and 
humans in Africa, but not at all in the UK. Increased disease vector 
populations were seen as important for plants and animals in the 
UK and for plants in Africa.
Many more disease drivers were considered important in Africa 
than in UK. For Africa, intriguingly, many respondents predicted 
lower risks arising from ‘Legislation and Systems of Government’ 
and ‘Conflict and War’ in 2030 compared to 2015, which reflects 
optimism about the future. 
Finally, the three elements of climate change that were examined 
(increased temperature, rainfall and drought) were all seen as 
important drivers for human disease risks in Africa; yet only drought 
was highlighted for animals, and only temperature and rainfall was 
highlighted for plants.
In the UK, drivers seen as generating high levels of risk for 
human diseases were: drug use leading to the emergence of drug-
resistant disease organisms and climate change, specifically rising 
temperatures. For UK plant diseases, the emergence of pesticide-
resistant disease strains and the lack of new pesticides, increased 
trade and transport of crops and higher ambient temperatures, 
were seen as important risk drivers. For UK animal diseases, lack 
of adequate systems for disease control, poor implementation of 
international systems of disease surveillance and control, increased 
ability to engineer new diseases or to exploit existing diseases for 
bio-terrorism, emergence of drug resistance and the lack of new 
drugs, increased trade in animals, increase in illegal practices 
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Responses for the years 2015 and 2030 that passed the first filter (moderate and high > 50%) and the second filter (high >50%), Foresight 
questionnaire 2005
Africa animals UK animals Africa plants UK plants Africa humans UK humans
Year 2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030 2015 2030
Source
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
Pathway
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2.10 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2.11 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Driver: Legislation & government
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.1.7
Driver: Technology & innovation
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
3.2.6
3.2.7
3.2.8
Driver: Conflict & war
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Driver: Economic factors
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.4.7
Driver: Human activity & social factors
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.5.4
3.5.5
3.5.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Driver: Climate change
3.6.1
3.6.2
3.6.3
The numbers in the first column correspond to the variables listed in Table 2. 
Black cells represent ‘high risks’ (factors passed the first and second filter); grey cells represent ‘moderate risks’ (factors that passed the first filter but not the 
second); empty cells represent ‘low risks’ (factors that passed neither filter).
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leading to the spread of diseases and climate change, specifically 
increased temperatures, were highlighted as important.
High hazard, low probability responses
We also examined high hazard, low probability risks, which 
would be scored as a 3 (1 for probability multiplied by 3 for hazard) 
and therefore would not have passed through the data-filtering 
analysis. However, only 17 out of the total 636 possible responses 
were of this nature, and in each case only between two and four 
respondents had categorised the risk in this way. 
Discussion: Employing Foresight to understand future disease 
outcomes
If it is clear that a wide range of factors influence the spread 
of infectious disease [1-3,14], then there is a need to better 
understand and prioritise them:
“The rate and scale of global change in agriculture, trade, 
demographics, species translocations and invasions, microbial 
adaptation, and other complex factors, have evidently outstripped 
our ability to understand and respond to EIDs [emerging infectious 
diseases], and exposed serious limitations of approaches that fail 
to engage with the wider contexts from which infectious diseases 
emerge.” [15]
For each factor, it is important to: identify and quantify the 
relevant sources, pathways and drivers, model their relationships 
and interactions, and identify potential intervention points where 
synergistic interactions promoting disease emergence can be 
arrested. Quantitative analyses are ideally suited for this, yet in 
many instances crucial knowledge gaps exist, creating the need for 
complementary analyses to help guide decision-making and priority-
setting until more hard evidence becomes available. Although some 
analysts have called for interaction across a very broad range of 
expertise [15-17], there has been little discussion about how this 
could be practically done.
Foresight projects, such as the UK DIID project, aim to 
develop scientific and technological priorities, integrate multi-
disciplinary perspectives, co-ordinate research opportunities with 
economic and social needs, and stimulate communication and 
partnerships between researchers, research users and research 
funders [18,19]. Meanwhile, survey methodologies such as 
Delphi enable a systematic approach to eliciting, aggregating and 
synthesising expert opinions [20-22]. The approach we describe 
here begins to develop a framework for identifying, assessing and 
prioritising infectious disease spread by incorporating a wide range 
of perspectives and insights into the analysis. Through engaging a 
wide range of expertise, we identified and developed a preliminary 
prioritisation of the myriad factors relevant to plant, animal and 
human disease.
There are, of course, limitations to this approach. One is that in 
order to cover the broad geographic and disease range mandated 
by this project, it was inevitable that the disease systems model 
on which the research was based would be rather general; the 
predictions should be interpreted with this in mind. 
One other limitation of our study, and perhaps of Foresight 
in general, is that the answers are not ‘evidence-based’ in the 
scientific sense of the word. In our study, the respondents’ 
predictions are based on their experience and knowledge, and 
represent the respondents’ expectations of future courses of events. 
Where little data exist (necessarily the case when mapping the 
future), or where these data are not easily comparable, we would 
suggest that demonstrating general agreement – or the lack thereof 
– on common themes across a broad range of disciplines and 
institutions can be an important starting point for framing and 
pursuing multi-agency action. 
Finally, we are also aware that our disease systems approach 
has been unrealistically linear. For any specific disease, dynamic 
interactions and feedback loops among drivers, sources and 
pathways will amplify or diminish overall disease risks. However, it 
was not possible to include this level of sophistication in a general, 
meta-level model applicable to all the disease categories in this 
study. Future studies would be well advised to focus on specific 
classes of disease, or even on specific drivers, pathways or sources 
of disease.
Ultimately, the challenge is to identify the processes that 
influence the spread of new and emerging diseases before they 
become significant problems for national public health systems or 
public health emergencies of international concern. The approach 
described here, appropriately applied, could help facilitate this.
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